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A LOOK AT INTERNAL CONTROL
By GEORGE C. SPARKS, JR., C.P.A.
It has been conservatively estimated that 
American business losses through fraud and 
employee dishonesty in the past year 
amounted to $500,000,000. Probably it 
would be a safe guess that several times 
this amount is lost annually through the 
simple process of waste and mishandling 
of goods. This means then, that costs run­
ning into billions of dollars a year are being 
incurred by American business as a direct 
result of some weakness in control, or per­
haps even the complete lack of controls,
At a time like the present where we 
pride ourselves on efficiency and production 
it must come as quite a shock to find so 
much potential profit slipping right out 
from under our noses. However, it is actu­
ally a direct result of the growth of our 
economy as a whole. Perhaps, if we point 
out the simple parallel between the develop­
ment of the machine age, as we know and 
accept it, and the growth of the business 
unit itself, we can see the reason for this.
As machines are improved the individual 
laborer contributes less and less to the ac­
tual construction of the product and be­
comes more of a machine watcher or tender. 
Likewise, as the business unit grows the 
owner, of necessity, must take a less active 
part in all of the activities and step back to 
a point where he can watch, being forced 
to delegate many of his functions to sub­
ordinates. The more powers he delegates 
the more he must resort to being a watcher 
or controller of others.
Only fifty years ago, an outstanding ac­
counting scholar of the day visualized in­
ternal control as having only three essential 
elements, namely:
1. Division of duties
2. Use of bookkeeping proofs
3. Rotation of personnel
Today we find that most ideas as to what 
“internal control” encompasses are far 
broader in scope. The American Institute 
of Accountants’ Committee on Auditing has 
given us the following definition:
“Internal Control comprises the plan of 
organization and all of the coordinate meth­
ods and measures adopted within a business 
to safeguard its assets, check the accuracy 
and reliability of its accounting data, pro­
mote operational efficiency, and encourage 
adherence to prescribed managerial poli­
cies.”
Currently there is really nothing in the 
way of a business function that doesn’t fall 
within the modern scope of internal control. 
Budgets are as important as the rotation 
of personnel; labor turnover and time study 
records offer possibilities for control equal 
to the use of bookkeeping proofs; and pur­
chase and sales controls give advantages the 
same as the division of duties does.
Why is it that many successful business 
men today will fire an employee who slips 
a $10 bill out of the cash register without 
a moment’s hesitation; and yet, admit with 
a wry smirk that his salesmen’s expense 
or “swindle” sheets cost him from $25 to 
$50 a week more than they should, saying 
simply that there is nothing he can do about 
it? Or, what about the owner who exer­
cises air-tight control over his cash and 
merchandise yet allows employees to take 
company trucks and automobiles home 
without even considering the impact that 
many long weekend trips will have on his 
profit picture ? Perhaps the answer to these 
riddles lies in the word “education”—not 
from the standpoint of the three R’s—but 
rather education as to the meaning and 
value of internal control in today’s business 
picture. The last war saw many slip-shod 
and poorly designed business practices de­
velop which today’s fiercely competitive 
economy will end. What form this ending 
will take depends to a large extent on how 
well you and I do our jobs.
Why do I say that? Simply because we 
as accountants (public or private) are 
probably the best prepared individuals con­
nected with the business organization to 
point up these deficiencies, whatever form 
they might take, and to educate employers 
or clients as to the benefits to be realized 
by eliminating them completely. The catch, 
however, is that too often we become so 
engrossed with proving our work out to a 
mathematical certainty that we fail to real­
ize just what is going on around us. The 
old cliche is certainly applicable here and 
“we are often too close to the forest to see 
the trees.”
Basically, I feel that today most busi­
nesses have a reasonably good control sys­
tem in operation—at least most progressive 
managements are cognizant of the need for 
controls of some kind. Assuming that an 
average company does incur a loss or turn 
up some fraudulent activity we immed­
iately ask then—“Why did it happen ?” The 
14
answer might be one of several.
You might say the system did just what 
it was supposed to do.
Many times we have heard the president 
or some other representative of top man­
agement explode with indignant wrath when 
told of a fraudulent act being discovered 
in his company. Usually it runs like this, 
“What! Well I want you to completely re­
vise the whole system and set it up so that 
won’t happen again!”
With a bit more reflection on the subject 
that same executive might very well realize 
that his system of internal control, if re­
sponsible for the culprit being exposed, 
actually was adequate all the time. In fact 
it is very likely that it accomplished ex­
actly what it was designed to do—that is, 
to reflect the unusual or the irregular act 
which led to the disclosure of fraud. The 
important point to keep in mind is that 
there might well be a great deal more to 
worry about where everything checks out 
perfectly each day, since the reason for such 
perfection could easily be an inadequate 
system of control which allows things to 
slip by unnoticed.
Your second answer as to why it happened 
might be to the effect that the controls are 
and always have been present, but the per­
sonnel in charge of carrying them out either 
didn’t realize what they were supposed to 
be doing or else their work was being done 
in a negligent haphazard manner.
For instance, a client of ours operates a 
number of retail outlets throughout this 
area. Close checks of sales records are 
made by tying in closely with the regularly 
submitted cash register readings. In fact, 
we even found it worth while a few years 
back to insist that the register tapes accom­
pany the reported readings. All cash must 
be deposited as soon as possible after the 
day of receipt and a duplicate deposit ticket 
submitted in support thereof. All disburse­
ments are made by the main office and all 
bank statements are received and reconciled 
by the main office. On the surface every­
thing is controlled—yet, on two occasions 
in the past several years we have picked up 
discrepancies that disclosed managers using 
company funds, through the simple expedi­
ent of testing deposits and the dates on 
which actually made. They were using the 
time-work plan of withholding deposits an 
extra day or two and using the money for 
their own purposes. Invariably though they 
became victims of their own poor bookkeep­
ing. As the deposit would lag behind fur­
ther and further it would become confused 
with and be made after that of a later day’s 
sales. When this happens, there can be 
little doubt that manipulation is taking 
place.
Here an office employee was reconciling 
the bank accounts monthly and had even 
been instructed to look for just such in­
stances. The moral is that even if the con­
trols exist they are no better than the 
efficiency with which the personnel applies 
them. Or, if you are on the other side of 
the fence, perhaps the moral is that you 
should hire a good accountant to keep up 
with your defalcations.
A third, and very common-sense answer 
as to why a loss took place might well be 
that changes in procedures or lines of 
responsibility have been made without con­
sideration being given to changing corres­
ponding controls.
One company employing door-to-door 
salesmen required all charges for work to 
be calculated in the store office by the man­
ager or the office clerk and that payments 
were to be made directly to the store.
One of the salesmen showed considerable 
enthusiasm for his job and an eagerness 
to do more work than was expected of him. 
First, he volunteered to prepare the job 
tickets and invoices for his work. Next, he 
offered to put through the charges in the 
office, and finally, assumed the responsibility 
for collection. The office clerk was only too 
pleased to be relieved of some of her duties. 
However, it will be seen that the net result 
was the placing of the entire accounting and 
collections routine in the hands of the sales­
man. Before long he began to charge less 
than the correct amounts to accounts receiv­
able, but collected in full from the custom­
ers. The difference went into his own pocket.
Unfortunately for the salesman, one of 
the customers came into the office to pay 
his account. When it was discovered that 
the charge against him in the accounts re­
ceivable ledger was lower than his copy of 
the invoice, investigation soon revealed 
fraud.
The controls were sufficient in this case; 
they were simply not being maintained.
Another case involved a large department 
store where credit slips for return of mer­
chandise required the department buyer’s 
signature. Due to infrequent returns and 
the resalability of the merchandise this pro­
cedure was relaxed in a department han­
dling household equipment in order to 
permit several senior sales clerks to approve 
these credits.
Shortly after the change small increases 
began to be noticed in the ratio of returned 
sales. When the inventory shrinkage figures 
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began to show a slight increase also, interest 
was stirred enough to cause investigation.
The examination included contact with 
customers whose names were shown on the 
return slips, and it was immediately dis­
covered that some of the names were fraud­
ulent. The fraudulent slips were traced to 
one of the senior clerks. When confronted 
with the facts, he confessed to originating 
and approving completely fraudulent re­
turns over a considerable period. Credit 
slips were originated by him when no mer­
chandise was returned, and the proceeds 
had been collected in cash. The total amount 
of loss was over $50,000 due to a relaxing 
of controls over returned merchandise with­
out a compensating change to offset an 
obvious weakness.
Many times the answer as to why a loss 
is suffered is simply that no appreciable 
measures can be taken to offset the possibil­
ity of them happening. This arises more 
often than not where the possibility of loss 
is realized but it is accepted more or less 
as a “calculated” risk on the part of man­
agement.
I have in mind a very recent case in which 
I confronted the management of a small 
variety store chain with the fact that one 
of its stores was showing a constant de­
clining gross margin on sales. When the 
subject was first presented the margin had 
dropped from a respectable 37.5% to about 
36% and management simply attributed it 
to a wave of shoplifting and possibly lower 
markups on purchases. Since the neighbor­
hood was of questionable character that 
explanation seemed feasible. To make a long 
story short, it took a loss from operations 
to jar management into taking concrete 
action. As long as a profit was being rea­
lized no one seriously thought there was 
anything too wrong. Even then it took a 
month or more before a break developed 
which led to disclosure of what was happen­
ing, and that break was a clerk under­
ringing a sale a mere 50 cents. A floor man 
caught the under-ring, took the girl back to 
the office and before it was over with got 
a substantial background of what was hap­
pening. By quick action and cooperation of 
a shopping service, they were able to round 
up twelve clerks that were involved—all 
confessing to stealing through the following 
methods :
1. Under-ringing sales, the cash being 
picked up by another girl from the 
register at an opportune time.
2. Slipping merchandise into their stock­
ings and undergarments when behind 
the counter.
3. By use of accomplices that would pose 
as customers and receive possibly $5.00 
or $6.00 worth of merchandise in a 
bag for only $1.00. At a later time they 
would get together and split the gains.
When all the smoke cleared, losses ap­
proximating $25,000 were determined— 
much more than the so-called “calculated 
risk” was expected to amount to.
Another situation that is difficult to build 
real controls around is the route salesman 
operation where promotion “deals” are 
made whereby the purchase of a given 
quantity entitles the customer to a free 
carton of goods. Oftentimes the salesman 
is tempted to keep the “free” merchandise 
to sell later and pocket the receipts. The 
best protection against this is widespread 
publicity and activity by sales supervisors. 
Usually, the supervisors will call on the 
larger customers and, in addition, they may 
ride the routes to assist the salesman at 
the time of the “deal.”
Very often the finest system of control 
is rendered worthless where personal friend­
ships and old time acquaintances are in­
volved. For example, I read of this case 
some time ago:
The thief in this situation was accounts 
receivable clerk and since all receipts were 
by check he was also responsible for making 
deposits. This failure to establish close con­
trol over the checks as well as to separate 
the duties of cashier and accounts receiv­
able clerk proved to be the weakness of the 
system. The checks would be stamped with 
the special endorsement “Pay to the order 
of X bank, XYZ Corporation,” and this was 
felt to be protection against anyone short­
ing the receipts. However, our thief had his 
methods too, and when he would make a 
deposit a fairly large check would be pre­
sented separately to the bank teller and he 
would ask for cash. The explanation in this 
particular case was that the company needed 
cash for black market purchases which could 
not show on the books. Being well known, 
his explanation was accepted not only at 
the original bank but at a second bank when 
the account was changed over. In all, the 
fraud amounted to about $166,000, covered 
a period of time of over three years, involved 
two banks, survived several independent 
audits, and was only discovered when a new 
teller questioned the validity of the transac­
tion.
Another case based on personal relation­
ships involved a company operating grain 
elevators in small rural communities. One 
of its part-time managers was also a town 
official and well respected in his community. 
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